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Plaintiff, 
) 
) DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT 
) FULTON COUNTY. GA 
) 
) Civil Action File No. 
) 2014CV250927 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
APR 0 7 2015 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
JEANNE VIATOR, 
v. 
ALLlANZ LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., MY 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, CHARLES 
MARTINEZ II, and TOM WOODWARD, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT TOM WOODWARD'S RENEWED PARTIAL MOTION TO 
DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, 
AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
On March 11, 2015, Counsel appeared before the Court to present oral argument 
on Defendant Tom Woodward's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion for 
a More Definite Statement, and his Motion to Strike. Upon consideration of the 
arguments of the parties, the briefs submitted on the Motions, and the pleadings in this 
case, the Court finds as follows: 
Viewing the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the pleader, 
Plaintiff Jeanne Viator ("Viator") was recently widowed and suffering from deep grief 
when Defendant Charles Martinez, II, ("Martinez") began soliciting her to purchase 
various indexed annuities offered by Defendant Allianz Life Insurance Company of 
North America, Inc. ("Allianz"). Martinez knew she was emotionally distressed and that 
she did not have any specialized knowledge of investments, tax regulations, retirement 
planning, or annuity contracts. Martinez used this knowledge to his benefit to persuade 
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Viator to purchase Allianz products as part of a scheme to move her assets into high 
commission annuities while contractually limiting her access to the funds. 
Between mid-2009 and April 2011, Martinez convinced Viator to purchase three 
Allianz annuity contracts, Master Dex 5 Plus Contract No. XXXX4083 ("Contract 4083"), 
Master Dex X Contract No. XXXX9779 ("Contract 9779"), and Master Dex X Contract 
No. XXX 6646 ("Contract 6646"). He also persuaded her to add premium to Contract 
4083, which had a ten year surrender penalty for early withdrawal. Contract 6646 also 
had a ten year surrender penalty, but, it is unclear if Contract 9779 contained a similar 
term.' 
Unbeknownst to Viator, Martinez was not authorized to sell Contract 4083 or 
Contract 9779. Therefore, Defendant Tom Woodward ("Woodward") signed the annuity 
applications, was noted as the agent of record, received commissions, and split the 
commissions with Martinez for those two contracts. However, Woodward never spoke 
to Viator about the annuities. 
Viator alleges that the Defendants made misrepresentations and omissions as 
part of a scheme to convince her to purchase the annuities. Contracts 4083 and 9779 
were sold on the premise that Viator would profit from an upswing in the market while 
remaining unaffected by poor market performance. However, neither Martinez nor 
Woodward ever discussed investment options with Viator after the purchases. As a 
result, the annuity contracts, which could have participated in various market upside 
options, were held in the "cash return" option and generated a return of only 2.4%. 
1 The complaint generally contends that Viator could not access her funds without loss from payment of 
unconscionable penalties, but fails to state that Contract 9779 had a withdrawal penalty. 
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Viator contends that she was promised that a bonus amount equal to a 
percentage of the initial investment would be added to the invested amount. However, 
none of the Defendants ever revealed that the bonus amount would not be counted 
toward surrender value if the annuities were surrendered prior to annuitization. 
Additionally, she was not advised of the tax consequences of placing annuities in a 
qualified IRA or the tax consequences of surrendering an annuity without annuitization. 
Finally, Viator claims that she was not told about the commissions paid or the internal 
expenses of various contracts as compared to other potential investments. 
The complaint alleges Defendants conspired to violate the Georgia RICO Ace 
and did so through at least two prior acts of theft by deception, mail fraud, and wire 
fraud by "making and transmitting various documents by email.facsimile.U.S.Mail. and 
by telephone, and by wire transfer of funds from bank to bank ... in furtherance of one or 
more incidents, schemes, or transactions ... " In addition to the Georgia RICO claim, 
Viator claims fraudulent misrepresentation, or, in the alternative, negligent 
misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. She prays for damages in an amount 
to be determined at trial. 
Woodward moves to dismiss Count 1, Violation of the Georgia RICO Act. 
Alternatively, he moves for a more definite statement as to damages, fraud, and the 
RICO claim under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-12(e) and 9-11-9(b). Finally, Woodward moves to 
strike allegations from the complaint relating to prior litigation involving Allianz. 
2 O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq. 
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I. Woodward's Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Motion for a More Definite 
Statement 
Woodward argues that Count 1 alleging a violation of the Georgia RICO Act 
should be dismissed because there is no injury alleged or, if there is injury alleged, it 
was not proximately caused by the predicate acts. 
To assert a civil claim under the Georgia RICO Act, the plaintiff must allege that, 
"the defendants violated or conspired to violate the RICO statute; that as a result of this 
conduct the plaintiff has suffered injury; and that defendant's violation of or conspiracy 
to violate the RICO statute was the proximate cause of the injury." Wylie v. Denton, 323 
Ga. App. 161, 165 (2013). Woodward argues that the only injury alleged is the 
underperformance of the annuities. This is not a case in which non-existent or bogus 
investments were sold to Plaintiff. There is no allegation that the annuities were not a 
legal investment; only that Viator did not understand exactly what was in the contracts 
she bought because of the wrongful conduct of the Defendants. Accordingly, the Court 
finds that the injury alleged in the complaint was not proximately caused by any alleged 
wrongdoing by Woodward. Woodward's motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and it 
is not necessary to address his alternative motion for a more definite statement. 
II. Motion to Strike 
Woodward argues that Viator's allegations regarding lawsuits against Allianz 
should be struck from the complaint pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(f), because they 
are immaterial to the current claim and constitute a prejudicial attempt to introduce 
evidence of lawsuits in which Woodward was not involved. However, theses allegation 
could be probative of Woodward's intent in dealing with Viator and, therefore, will not be 
struck from the Complaint. 
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O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(f) provides, "[u]pon motion made by a party within 30 days 
after the service of the pleading upon him ... the court may order stricken from any 
pleading ... any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." O.C.G.A. § 9- 
11-12(f). The four terms "redundant," "immaterial," "impertinent," and "scandalous," are 
not mutually exclusive; there is a certain amount of overlapping between them, 
particularly the first three. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. v. McGivern, 132 Ga. App 297, 
302 (1974). 
To determine whether a matter is impertinent one must first 
determine the scope of the issues in controversy, and then, under 
12(f) determine whether the matter injected in the pleadings is 
relevant or material thereto. Motions to strike alleged redundant, 
immaterial or impertinent or scandalous matter are not favored. 
Matter in pleadings will not be stricken unless it is clear that it can 
have no possible bearing upon the subject matter of the litigation, 
and if there is any doubt as to whether under any contingency the 
matter may raise an issue, the motion should be denied. 
Id. at 302 (internal citations omitted). The challenged allegation, sentence two of 
paragraph 38, states that all Defendants had knowledge of prior lawsuits against Allianz 
for activities similar to those alleged here. The complaint contends that awareness of 
the lawsuits "illustrates" Defendants' knowledge of the falsity of their representations 
and their material omissions. 
Woodward's knowledge of suits against Allianz for similar activities and their 
resolution could be probative in demonstrating his scienter and intent in his dealings 
with Viator. Because motions to strike pleadings are not favored and previous suits 
against Allianz could have a bearing on this litigation, Woodward's Motion to Strike is 
hereby DENIED. 
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SO ORDERED this _2day of April, 2015. 
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